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PENDING: A NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
John E. Cosgrove*
A federal system of government, by necessity, is engaged in continuing
problems of adjusting and reappraising the relative jurisdictions of local and
national power. Never simple, this adjustment in the United States has
nevertheless been accomplished, until now, in an atmosphere where we could
"afford" economic policies often characterized by guesswork, social irrespon-
sibility, fragmentation, and even social invalidity. The green years, however,
have passed. It would now seem that our complex and interdependent indus-
trial society served by free business and free trade unions deserves, and
indeed requires, a national labor policy. We have approached such a policy
before, and some have considered it clearly established. Recent jurisdictional
developments in the field of labor relations, however, have upset these
premature assumptions and have clearly revealed the inadequacies of our
present labor policy.
I. THE ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT
In contemplation of law collective bargaining, or more precisely trade
unions, moved from a criminal conspiracy classification applied in the
famous Cordwainers' case to that of a legitimate economic association2 with
additional rights of union security being permitted primarily on a state-by-
state basis. It was not until the interpretations 3 of the Sherman Antitrust Act4
provided the statutory basis for the issuance of federal injunctions and the
* Assistant Director of Education, AFL-CIO. LL.B. Notre Dame. Member of the Iowa Bar.
Former Lecturer in Labor Law, Drake University. Former Attorney, Office of Solicitor, United States
Department of Labor. Lecturer in Labor Problems, Georgetown University.
1 Case of the Philadelphia Cordwainers, 3 COM,'MONS & GiImoP, DoCUMENTARY HISTORY oi
AsmUcAN INDusmAxL SocarTY 59 (Philadelphia Mayor's Ct. 1806).
2 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842). See also Nelles, Commonwealth v.
Hunt, 32 CoLum. L. Rav. 1128 (1932).
8 United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894) (injunction issued), appeal dismissed,
158 U.S. 564 (1895). Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908)(damages allowed).
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
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assessment of treble damages in labor disputes, however, that a federal pat-
tern of a modern law of unions developed. In an attempt to limit such in-
junctions-abortive because the federal courts misconstrued its provisions5
-the Clayton Antitrust Act 6 was enacted, announcing for the first time a
limited national legislative policy for labor generally.
7
While it is mild doctrine today, the 1914 policy of the Clayton Act was
an important departure from what had been considered the correct treatment
of trade unions. For the first time since the period immediately following the
Civil War, Congress recognized a distinction between property and men,
stating that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce."8 However, the importance of this legislative determination for
present purposes is not in its content alone, but rather, in the fact that here
was a national finding by the federal legislature not confined to any particular
group or class of workers.
From their beginning the 1930's brought about a vigorous attempt to
establish a broad national labor policy. State efforts in the 1920's had proved
as unable to build strong trade unions as they were to prove unable to feed
the starving in the 1930's. Accordingly, in each case, the people turned to
the federal government.
After the electric-like shocks of depression forever banished from the
national mind the peculiar societal illusions of the 1920's, a national labor
policy was firmly announced in the National Industrial Recovery Act.' The
famous pronouncement in section 710 of the legal right of employees to or-
ganize was in no way affected by the constitutional repugnance of other
provisions of the act. It will be recalled that the same concept was enacted
in the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)," again as section 7.1-1
With the establishment of the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in the
Jones & Laughlin Steel case, 13 the United States at last had a firm national
labor relations policy. Soon thereafter the concept of a national labor policy,
first applied to labor relations, was extended to labor standards as well, by
the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.14
5 The Clayton Act § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1952), did not prevent courts
from issuing injunctions in labor disputes to restrain actions deemed illegal. Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). As observed in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,
229-31 (1941), agitation subsequent to the Duplex decision caused Congress to enact the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952), which removed the fetters upon trade
union activities resulting from the judicial construction and application of § 20 of the Clayton Act.
Thus Congress determined that the intent of § 20, to limit the use of injunctions in labor disputes,
had been nullified by court decision therefore necessitating corrective legislation. See H.R. REt. No.
669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1931).
6 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952).
7 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952). See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219, 231 (1941).
8 Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).
9 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
10 48 Stat. 198-99 (1933).
11 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
12 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
13 Five cases decided April 12, 1937, upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations
Act. They were led by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
14 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952).
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Enforcement of the Wagner Act by the National Labor Relations Board
rested from the beginning on the assumption that there could be either one
or forty-eight labor relations policies but not both, and the NLRB noted that
Congress had pre-empted control of labor relations both in interstate com-
merce as well as in industries "affecting" interstate commerce. The courts
agreed with the Board that Congress had intended, and indeed had the right,
to legislate such control of labor relations and that, once done, Congress'
purpose could not be defeated by divergent state laws. This basic position
is not only the most workable, it is the only position consonant with the
concept of a federal system. Denial of this thesis implies a partial return to
the monumental fragmentation of the Articles of Confederation.
U_. FEDERAL SUPREMACY
The nature of the federal system and the place of the Constitution
within it are explained in Article VI of the Federal Constitution. It will be
recalled that this article is not only decisive but relatively definitive: "This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." From Article VI flows the
doctrine of pre-emption, to wit: if Congress has constitutionally occupied
a given field of regulation, the jurisdiction of the federal government is
thereby exclusive, thus precluding the states from acting within the same
area. As the doctrine of pre-emption developed, only one major exception
was thought to apply. Where Congress specifically permitted state action in
an area it had otherwise occupied, pre-emption by the federal government
was to the same degree qualified.
The Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts15 were, of course, monumental as-
sertions of federal jurisdiction over the field of labor relations. In the second
enactment, Congress, in section 10(a) premised: "The Board is empowered,
as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice [enumerated in section 8] affecting commerce. This power
1hall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise. .. .
(Emphasis added.)
The exclusive character of federal pre-emption in the field of labor re-
lations is emphasized by the provision in section 10(a) allowing the NLRB
to cede jurisdiction to state agencies "unless the provision of the State or
Territorial statute applicable . . . is inconsistent with the corresponding
provisions of this [act]."' 7 It is significant to note that no agreement of ces-
sion to a state agency has been made because no state law has been found to
have the requisite consistency with the federal act.
15 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
16 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952).
17 Ibid.
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There is, however, in one area a clear statutory cession of jurisdiction to
the states. This area is the vital field of union security."8 Section 8(a) (3)19
of the federal act outlaws the "closed shop" but permits the modified form of
union security available in the "union shop." In section 14(b), 20 however,
final determination of the right to the "union shop" is ceded to the states and
territories. The law in nineteen states prohibiting the "union shop" - the
so-called "Right-To-Work" laws - are valid in interstate industries only by
reason of section 14(b) of the federal statute; they have no independent
validity. There can be no question that the repeal of section 14(b) would
immediately reduce such state enactments to intrastate effectiveness only.
Another factor in section 14(b) requires notice in the context of this
discussion. The cession contained in that section is made not only to the
fStates, but to the territories as well. Since territories are creatures of the
federal government, it can scarcely be maintained that they have some
"sovereignty" or inherent rights against the federal power. The day has not
yet arrived when the United States must face, in addition to the cronic tenth-
amendment problem of "States' Rights," a new issue of "Territories' Rights."
Accordingly, it can be inferred that section 14(b) represents a voluntary
decision of the 80th Congress, without respect to recognition of any reserved
states' rights in interstate labor relations that might possibly be required by
the ninth or tenth amendments.
One further point must be made on this controversial section of the
Taft-Hartley Act. The conclusion that Congress has determined to leave
the issue of union security in interstate commerce completely to local control
is, at best, a half-truth. By the cession of section 14(b), the states are given
the negative power only to prohibit, and not the power to promote actively,
the various forms of union security. It is only where the state laws prohibit
union security that they prevail over the federal act. In New York, for ex-
ample, where the closed shop is permitted in intrastate commerce, 21 federal,
rather than the state law, obtains as to interstate commerce. By granting the
states power only to eliminate this form of union security in interstate com-
merce, Congress has released a very limited legislative power to the states.
1m. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION
One would readily assume that the vast scope of federal authority in la-
bor-management relations under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 would be definitely com-
prehensive and exclusive. There have been assertions of the Board and the
courts under the language of the National Labor Relations Act, originally and
as amended, that such is the law. Together with these assertions, however,
there have been qualifications, limitations and nice distinctions which have
18 For a discussion of "Right-to-Work" laws and their constitutionality, see Cosgrove, Iowa's
Labor Law, 38 IowA L. REv. 65 (1952).
19 61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (i952).
20 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
21 N.Y. LABoR LAw § 704(5). See also Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y. 1, 12 N.E.2d 547 (1938).
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succeeded in obfuscating both the intent of Congress and the practice of the
Board. Three recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
crystallized the problem without aiding its solution. Particular notice will be
taken of them later in this development.
Perhaps the best statement of the rule that the federal act's pre-emption
is exclusive was contained in the unanimous opinion of Garner v. Teamsters
Union.2 2 In that case a lower court's injunction against peaceful picketing of
a warehouse dock had been vacated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Of the twenty-four employees involved in the picketing, only four were mem-
bers of the union involved. The purpose of the picketing was to obtain a
union security agreement. Apparently the employer could have asked relief
of the NLRB but he chose the state court instead. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, two arguments were advanced in favor of the state
court injunction. The first was that the state court retained jurisdiction to
issue the injunction because the federal power had not been exclusively ex-
ercised in this situation. To this contention the Supreme Court agreed that
"the state still may exercise its historic powers over such traditionally local
matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways. 23
But nevertheless the Court recognized the exclusive character of federal
jurisdiction in this area by announcing:
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these . . . conflicts likely to arise from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.24
(Emphasis added.)
The second argument advanced was that since the federal act protected
only public rights, state remedies must be available to protect private rights.
The Court answered that "even if. . . distinctly private rights were enforced
by the state authorities, it does not follow that the state and federal authorities
may supplement each other in cases of this type. The conflict lies in remedies
not rights.... When two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same
activity, a conflict is inevitable." 25 Not willing to sustain the conflict, the
Court affirmed the state high court in vacating the order.
In summing up its grounds for decision, the Supreme Court stated the
rule well:
We conclude that when federal power constitutionally is exerted for
the protection of public and private interests, or both, it becomes the
supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented or ex-
tended by a state procedure merely because it will apply some doctrine
of private right.26
The Guss series of cases27 reasserted the exclusiveness of the federal
pre-emption of labor relations under the federal act's full use of the Commerce
Clause, but they raised the new problem of jurisdiction when the NLRB de-
22 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
23 Id. at 488.
24 Id. at 490.
25 Id. at 498-99.
26 Id. at 500-01.
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clined to act. In the chief case, the employer provided photographic equip-
ment to the United States Air Force, specifically to air force bases both within
and without the state of residence. This business came within the statutory
jurisdiction of the NLRB but not within its self-imposed jurisdictional stand-
ards. Consequently, the NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction when the
United Steelworkers of America filed an application for certification. The
union then filed its application with the Utah State Labor Relations Board
which accepted jurisdiction and was upheld in so doing by the Utah Supreme
Court. No cession agreement under section 10 existed between the NLRB
and the state of Utah. Thus it was clear that if there had not been an NLRB
declination, the State Board's action would be precluded under the GarnersS
rule.
29
Although Guss could be distinguished from Garner in that no determina-
tion by the NLRB had occurred in the latter case, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Supreme Court of Utah, announcing through Chief
Justice Warren that "since Congress' power in the area of commerce among
the states is plenary, its judgment must be respected whatever policy ob-
jections there may be to creation of a no-man's-land."30 The problem was
stated even more succinctly in a Senate report summarizing the decisions:
"In these cases the situation seems to be that the Board will not assert juris-
diction, the states are forbidden to do so, and the injured parties are deprived
of any forum in which to seek relief."31 While this may be an overstatement
of the case, it does approximate the problem. The "easy" answer to this ques-
tion is supplementary state-federal jurisdiction. However, the answer that
will preserve a national labor policy is either a complete federal remedial
system, or at least a congressional determination of the proper remedies that
can issue from each source, state or federal.
A somewhat analogous problem is presented by the fact that the majority
of the states have no labor-relations laws providing for peaceful determination
of bargaining rights or representation in intrastate commerce. In thousands
of such instances, workers desiring organization have been forced to strike or
suffer a lockout to support their demand for collective action. In some cases
they have prevailed and gained recognition. In other instances, however, they
have had their unity destroyed by economic pressure and have either returned
to their jobs on the best terms available as a result of individual "bargaining"
with the employer or have had to seek a livelihood elsewhere. The intrastate
business involved often may "affect" interstate commerce, but the Board's
self-imposed jurisdictional standards generally leave such workers without
those remedies which are federally exclusive.
27 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Building Trade Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S.
26 (1957). These three cases were all decided the same day, and the majority opinions are essentially
similar. The dissent of Mr. Justice Burton, in which Mr. Justice Clark joined, is found in the
Guss case but is applicable to all three cases.
28 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
29 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
30 Id. at 11.
31 S. RaE. No. 1211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
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While the Guss decisions lack utopian clarity as to what should be
done to remedy this problem, they were judicial invitations for legislation.
This invitation was based upon the insight that a national labor relations
policy had merit in logic. The Court did not feel that the failure of con-
gressional or agency action would justify the interposition of judicial au-
thority - either state or federal - to fill the vacuum. Such a solution would
amount to a denial of the separation of powers concept and ultimately con-
stitute an attack on the federal system itself.
IV. THE DEPARTURE TO CONFLICT
The relationship of the Taft-Hartley Act to state judicial authority and its
limiting effect on state jurisdiction as established by the Guss cases was
seriously revised during the 1957-58 term of the Supreme Court. Three de-
cisions spelled out important exceptions to the pre-emption doctrine, partially
destroying it.
A. The First Case
The first of the three decisions in importance grew out of a strike by
members of the United Automobile Workers at the Decatur, Alabama, divi-
sion of the Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company, in 1951.32
From July 18th to September 24th of that year, the UAW maintained a
picket line in the street before the plant. The street was the normal means of
ingress and egress. Plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that pickets stood
or walked in a compact circle across the entire street and thereby prevented
anyone from entering except for salaried workers who were allowed to pass.
One Paul S. Russell, employed at the plant as an electrician, was neither
a member of the union nor had he applied for membership. In fact, he was
a board member of the National Right-To-Work Committee, a group at-
tempting to bring about enactment of state and federal laws which would pro-
scribe the union security in collective bargaining agreements. It was alleged
and subsequently found that Russell attempted to cross the picket line to
return to work and found his way blocked by picketing workers. Someone
among the pickets "took hold" of his car. Threats of harm to Russell's person
and damage to his property were allegedly made. After being thus delayed,
Russell returned to his home. While the strike continued, Russell initiated
a back-to-work movement. For five weeks he solicited signatures on a peti-
tion urging re-opening of the plant and a return to work. His petition was
presented to the company on August 20th; on August 22nd the plant was re-
opened with many police officers in attendance.
An action was filed in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama,
by Russell against the UAW. He alleged that he had been kept from work,
as noted, and in an amended complaint, added that the union and its agent
had unlawfully conspired with others to wilfully and maliciously cause him to
32 UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
33 Goldberg, Labor Loses Out, 3 AFL-CIO Industrial Union Dep't Digest No. 4, 119, 123 (1958).
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lose wages. For this he demanded a judgment of $50,000 which included
damages for both loss of wages and mental anguish, as well as for punitive
damages.
To Russell's complaint, the defendant union interposed a plea to the
jurisdiction on the grounds that the NLRB's jurisdiction excluded that of
the state court. The amended complaint had specifically charged a violation
of section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the federal act. When Russell demurred to this
plea he was overruled and the issue was presented to the Supreme Court of
Alabama. This tribunal reversed the trial court on the question.34 Accord-
ingly, on remand the union's plea to the jurisdiction was again demurred to,
but this time the demurrer was upheld. The case was then tried before a jury
which returned a verdict of $10,000, apparently representing $500 in lost
wages and $9,500 punitive damages.3 5 This verdict was affirmed by the
Alabama Supreme Court, holding that there had been proved a tort of wrong-
ful interference with a lawful occupation.3 6 Certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court of the United States because of the vital jurisdictional
question.
3 7
The central issue before the Supreme Court was, of course, whether
federal (NLRB) jurisdiction was exclusive. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the
opinion of the Court, from which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas
dissented.
The Court affirmed the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court
primarily on the basis of its decision in United Construction Workers v.
Laburnum Construction Corp.,38 which held generally that the NLRB did
not have exclusive jurisdiction over a common law tort action so as to ex-
clude a state court's jurisdiction in this area, despite the fact that the conduct
complained of was also an unfair labor practice in contemplation of the
federal act.
Since it formed the basis of decision in Russell, the Laburnum decision
merits discussion. In that case the employer contracted to do certain con-
struction work on some mining property, the work to be performed by AFL
building tradesmen with whom the company had a collective bargaining
agreement. The United Construction Worker's representative, despite the
fact that the UCW had no members on the job, demanded sole bargaining
rights for the UCW, an arm of the United Mine Workers of America. When
this was refused, the representative re-appeared some days later with an
armed mob which threatened the workers and closed the job. The Laburnum
Corporation sued the UCW and recovered profits on the contract lost as a
result of the union's action, as well as punitive damages. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed.
34 Russell v. UAW, 258 Ala. 615, 64 So. 2d 384 (1953).
35 Russell was paid $100 per 'week and was prevented from working for five weeks, Russell v.
UAW, 356 U.S. 634, 652 (1958).
36 UAW, v. Russell, 264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175 (1956).
37 UAW v. Russell, 352 U.S. 915 (1956).
38 347 U.S. 656 (1954), affirming 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (1953).
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The precedent of the Garner case that a state court had no jurisdiction
to enjoin picketing, was distinguished by the Court in the Laburnum case
as follows: "In the Garner case; Congress had provided a federal administra-
tive remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its enforcement, with
which the state injunctive procedure conflicted. Here Congress has neither
provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court pro-
cedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct."39
Justice Jackson did not participate in this decision and Justice Douglas dis-
sented with Justice Black joining him. The dissent read in part: "A state
court or a state labor board could not enjoin that conduct, as Garner v.
Teamsters Union . . . teaches. And I think like reasons preclude a State
from applying other sanctions to it."
'40
Returning to Russell, the majority opinion by Justice Burton held that
the common law tort action can be adjudicated by a state court even though
activities constituting the tort are also covered by the federal act. He com-
pared the cases with Laburnum in that each involved a state court's award
of compensatory and punitive damages against a trade union for tortious
conduct which is also "assumed" to be an unfair labor practice. The opinion
admitted that since the Board is "authorized, under section 10(c) of the
Federal Act,41 to award back pay under certain circumstances, 42 there is
a distinction between the two cases arising out of the fact that the Russell
case was a suit for back wages while the Laburnum case was a suit for lost
profits. But the opinion continued, "This section is far from being an express
grant of exclusive jurisdiction superceding common-law actions, by either
an employer or an employee, to recover damages caused by the tortious con-
duct of a union.
'43
The Court's point was that common law tort actions in state forums may
provide punitive damages where the federal remedy would not, and that this
justified their availability to those who would bring such actions. The federal
remedy was, therefore, not intended to be exclusive. As to compensatory
damages, the Court admitted that "there is a possibility that both the Board
and the state courts have jurisdiction to award lost pay. However, that
possibility does not create the kind of 'conflict' of remedies" 44 proscribed
39 Id. at 663-64.
40 Id. at 670.
41 Section 10 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint was engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action in-
cluding reinstatment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this Act: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an em-
ployee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the
case may be, responsible for the discrimination.. . . 61 Stat. 147, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1952).
42 UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 641 (1958).
43 Id. at 642.
44 Id. at 644.
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since a completely identical remedy did not appear under the federal act.
The Court was persuaded by the fact that the NLRB's awards of damages
were discretionary.
The dissent by the Chief Justice, in which Justice Douglas joined, was
long and carefully considered. After reviewing the law, the dissent dis-
tinguished the Laburnum decision from Russell on the facts in three respects.
The dissent first pointed out that Laburnum was an action for damages re-
sulting from interference with a contractual relationship between the em-
ployer and the parties ordering the construction work, and that the unfair
labor practice was involved "only fortuitously."4 5 In Russell, the plaintiff re-
covered damages for interference with his "right to work during a strike,"4
a right protected by Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Here, in
other words, the unfair labor practice per se was the gist of the complaint.
Secondly, the dissent asserted, Laburnum involved a "stranger's" in-
terference, the UCW having not a single member on the job, whereas in
Russell the UAW was the certified bargaining agent and the plaintiff's loss
occurred incident to a strike to support economic demands. The Chief Justice
argued that a continuing union-employer relationship was to be expected and,
he wrote elsewhere in the opinion, that this should weigh crucially against
permitting the continuing bitterness engendered by prolonged litigation and
the allowance of punitive damages by state courts.
The dissent's final distinction was that the recovery of damages by the
single plaintiff in the Laburnum situation would presumably terminate the
litigation. In Russell, the Chief Justice noted, it would be only the beginning.
He observed that, as of decision day, twenty-nine other employees of the
struck firm had filed damage actions, in each case for $50,000.47 The- dissent
further observed that, Alabama law appears to permit these multiple actions. 41
Thus as a result of this strike, the union was faced with actions demanding a
total of $1,500,000, plus the legal expenses involved in defending them in-
dividually.
In support of his thesis that the states do not have power to award dam-
ages on the Russell facts, the Chief Justice referred to the legislative history of
the federal act, noting Sentator Taft's and others' frequent references to the
power retained in the states to act against criminal actions, but by contrast, the
absence of references to any power retained by the states to award civil
damages for harm arising from such conduct.4 9 He pointed out that there is
no issue in the Russell situation as to the states' admitted power to award
damages for physical injury. He then pinpointed the real area of conflict in
the jurisdictional question by posing the following social issue: "The un-
provoked inflicting of personal injuries during a period of labor unrest is
neither to be expected nor to be justified, but economic loss inevitably attends
45 Id. at 655.
46 Ibid.
47 Id. at 656-58.
48 Alabama Power Co. v. Goodwin, 210 Ala. 657, 99 So. 158 (1924).
49 UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 648 (1958).
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work stoppages."50 (Emphasis added.) The central technical issue of a na-
tional labor policy is observed by his dissent in this passage:
Even if we assume that the Board had no authority to award respondent
back pay in the circumstances of this case, the existence of such a gap
in the remedial schedule of federal legislation is no license for the States
to fashion correctives. 51
The Chief Justice's views are reflective of a judgment more valid than that
of the majority. The effect of allowing the state courts to award compensation
and to fix penalties for this and similar conduct will upset the pattern of rights
and remedies established by Congress and will frustrate the very policies the
federal act seeks to implement.
Relative to the contributions made by the views of local judges to in-
dustrial peace and their effect on the central issue of a national labor policy,
the instructions of the trial judge 'to the jury, in the Russell case, are worthy
of note. He charged, inter alia, on the question of punitive damages as
follows:
If, in this case, after considering all the evidence and under the instruc-
tions I have given you, you are reasonably satisfied that at the time com-
plained of and in doing the acts charged, the defendant . . actuated by
malice and actuated by ill-will, committed the unlawful and wrongful
act alleged, you, in addition to the actual damages, if any, may give
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant
or for making the defendant smart, not exceeding in all the amount
claimed in the complaint. 52 (Emphasis added.)
As Chief Justice Warren caustically observed in his dissent in Russell: "The
parties to labor controversies have enough devices for making one another
'smart' without this Court putting its stamp of approval on another. I can
conceive of nothing more disruptive of congenial labor relations than arming
employees, union and management with the potential for 'smarting' one an-
other with exemplary damages."53
B. The Second Case
Marcons Gonzales, a marine machinist and a member of Local Lodge
68 of the International Association of Machinists, in California, was ex-
pelled from the union by an act which he claimed was wrongful and in viola-
tion of his rights under the union's constitution, and by-laws. Accordingly, he
brought suit for reinstatement, loss of wages, and damages for mental suffer-
ing, and was awarded this relief. Under established California law, union
membership constituted a contract between the member and the organization,
and reinstatement was in order. Affirmed in the state court,54 the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case raised another important
question regarding the jurisdictional extent of the federal act. 55
50 Id. at 649.
51 Id. at 650.
52 Id. at 638.
53 Id. at 653.
54 Gonzales v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956).
55 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958).
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Affirming the award, the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States by Justice Frankfurter waxed eloquently that:
The statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the
States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be
translated into concreteness by the process of litigation elucidation. 56
The process of litigation here, in terms of the Gonzales case, has resulted in
a decision for dual authority. This conclusion is based upon the view of the
majority opinion that "the protection of union members in their rights as
members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union officers has not been
undertaken by federal law, and indeed the assertion of any such power has
been expressly denied, ' ' 57 (citing section 8(b) (1) of the act which gives
unions the authority to establish rules for union membership.) While this
may be true narrowly, it is also true that the act does expressly assert some
jurisdiction in this area by specifically forbidding the employer to deny em-
ployment for nonmembership in a union, where, in a union security situation,
membership is not available to all equally at the same dues and initiation fee.5 s
The gist of the decision is that even if the California action does constitute
interference with federal jurisdiction, this must be tolerated.
The dissent, again by Chief Justice Warren joined by Justice Douglas,
could not refrain from referring back to the eloquence in the majority opinion
of Justice Frankfurter, stating: "And if elucidating litigation was required
to dispel the Delphic nature of [the rule] the requisite concreteness has been
adequately supplied." 59 Here, as in Russell, the minority asked for a return
to the Garner rule, distinguished the Laburnum case, and pointed out the
abrupt departure from the Guss line of decisions. 0
C. The Third Case
In Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc.,6 1 the Court faced a substantially different
factual situation. The state court had found extensive picket line violence, in-
timidation and threats of violence at a firm engaged in interstate commerce
and, on this basis, issued an injunction restraining such activities and prohibit-
ing all picketing. The Supreme Court announced that the restraints on vio-
lence, threats of violence and intimidation were within the province of the
state judiciary but overturned the decree banning all picketing on the grounds
that this invaded the NLRB's exclusive domain. The Court indicated that the
entire state injunction would have found affirmation had the record shown
the violence to have been so emeshed with the picketing that only a complete
ban on collective activity could have restored the peace. This indication thus
reaffirmed the original holding made in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., decided in 1941.2
56 Id. at 619.
57 Id. at 620.
58 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
59 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 624 (1958).
60 Id. at 624-26.
61 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
62 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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In these cases the Court has employed a theory of divisibility of jurisdic-
tion: that the maintenance of order is a state function which cannot be de-
prived by the federal power, and on the other hand, that the NLRB jurisdic-
tion is a federal function which cannot be deprived by the states. That these
rules have become respectable through vintage is unassailable. The problem
is that they solve nothing, but merely recite a truism. Restatement of the
problem cannot properly be called its solution. The reality is that a state
court can, under these theories, effectively thwart federally-protected rights
and consequently national labor policy. It has at least a prima facia case for
so doing wherever the federal authority fails to exercise jurisdiction.
V. AN ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT POLICY
The majority of the American people accept collective bargaining as a
way of industrial life, since they have voted for it repeatedly. Neither national
political party has openly questioned the desirability of collective bargaining
nor the trade unions which make it possible. It is equally clear, unfortunately,
that there are major divisions of opinion on even this basic question in
various sections of the country. Two such groupings, come to mind im-
mediately
In the Central states, outside of the urban industrial centers, little is
known first hand about trade unionism. Even at this late date misconceptions
abound. Many people in small towns and rural areas feel that here is some-
thing alien, something not quite a proper part of the community or society.
This attitude is easily overstated, but it does have a currency, as a vestigial
remainder of the day when the trade union was virtually unknown in the
rich farm regions and when agriculture was the chief income producer.
In the Southern states, again outside the great urban industrial and port
centers, the union is a newcomer, the union organizer an oddity carrying his
neolite rather than a carpet bag. Because many unions must be organized
almost from scratch in this area, the representative of the union sent in to help
the organizing drive is of necessity a man from a distant state. As if these
handicaps were not enough, some employers have chosen to resist organiza-
tion by injecting the inflammatory race issue. Capitalizing on the trade
union's avowed espousal of full civil rights, such employers picture the union
as primarily an agency for integration.
For the present purpose, the issue is not whether these preconceptions
are right or wrong but whether the national labor policy can be implemented
and the federally-guaranteed industrial rights can be effectively protected if
they are to be measured in terms of local mores applied by local juries and
judges.
In sum, the implications of expanded state powers over interstate labor
relations in these three decisions just discussed - that is, the power in
Russell to award damages for economic loss caused by a strike, the power in
Gonzales to grant damages for wrongful dismissal from a union, and the re-
affirmation in Youngdahl of the power to enjoin picketing when emeshed with
violence - could be reasonably assessed by attempting to extend them logic-
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ally. Obvious questions might be whether an employee, denied compensation
in an NLRB proceeding can now enter the state court to receive com-
pensatory and puntive damages, or whether an NLRB determination that
there had been no discrimination in a union shop dismissal would preclude a
recovery of damages for dismissal in the state court.
The queries might also be extended to other federal statutes under
reasoning similar to that decisive in the majority opinions in these cases. With
these inroads being made into federal pre-emption in labor relations that has
traditionally found its source in the Taft-Hartley Act, it may be that the provi-
sions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act depriving federal courts of the injunctive
remedy in interstate labor disputes could be re-examined to serve as the
basis of the pre-emption doctrine, at least as to the injunctive remedy. If such
an argument of pre-emption could be gleaned from the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
would these decisions limiting Taft-Hartley pre-emption apply equally as well
to limit pre-emption of the injunctive remedy?63
Labor relations aside, one wonders whether the jurisdictional theories
of these cases might be applied by analogy to give greater control to state
commerce commissions over traffic between the states in areas where previ-
ously state action was presumed to conflict with the jurisdiction of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. Another assessment might be made by taking
the concept of concurrent jurisdiction which seems factually to broaden state
power in all respects, and applying it to the use of arguments narrowing
state jurisdiction in areas where it had previously been presumed to be ex-
clusive. For example, though Congress grants restrictive power to the states
over union security, could it be argued that the nature of dual jurisdiction
would allow a union to obtain a permanent NLRB blessing of its union shop
though such security is later outlawed by the state's Right-to-Work law -
on the theory of a "first-come, first-served" jurisdiction? Obviously this could
not result, the logical implications of the decisions notwithstanding.
While the answers to the above are sufficiently clear, it is just as clear
that the decisions have opened a Pandora's box, the contents of which serious-
ly becloud and may seriously harass labor-management relations. 4
It is of course too soon to suggest with any certainty what these decisions
imply for trade unions and the labor-management relation. It is already
obvious, however, that unions will have to assess with utmost care the relation
of their programs and actions to state laws and procedures. There is, as the
Chief Justice pointed out in his Russell dissent, "a very real prospect of
staggering punitive damages accumulated through successive actions by
63 See a situation where such a theory might be advanced in Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v.
Teamsters, Local 612, 27 U.S.L. WEaK 2345 (Ala. Jan. 8, 1959), where the state court enjoined
Teamster activity because the leasing agreements under which they operated made them not
employees, but independent contractors outside the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act. Contrast this
decision with the more recent decision of the Supreme Court in Teamsters Union, Local 24 v.
Oliver, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4077 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1959).
64 See Pierce v. Otis Elevator Co., 331 P.2d 481 (Okla. 1958), where the court held on the
authority of Laburnum, Gonzales, and Russell that the state court has jurisdiction to award damages
for not only common law, but statutory torts as well, even though they constitute unfair labor
practices under the Taft-Hartley Act.
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parties injured by members who have succumbed to the emotion that fre-
quently accompanies concerted activities during labor unrest." 5 Elaborating
on this, one authority6 has suggested that the Russell decision ".... might
imperil the very right to strike by making bankruptcy the penalty for engaging
in this guaranteed, constitutional right."
Commenting on the two cases the New York Times asks whether"...
it is sound public policy to leave open the floodgates to all the state courtq
to differing interpretations of what are 'unfair labor practices' in interstate
commerce and of what the penalties should be for pursuing them .... 1
From the earliest days two factors were clear in American unions' strug-
gle for existence and recognition: (1) jail sentences and fines against individ-
uals could not prevent the growth of the trade unions and (2) unions required
assets, such as strike funds, as well as money for organization, education, re-
search and other activities. From this flowed the thesis that the way to weaken
the labor movement was to attack its collective purse. Traditionally this came
by way of contempt proceedings based on violations of shot-gun injunctions
often issued without notice or hearing. 8 It now appears that since the injunc-
tion has been limited so effectively by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and much
of this limitation is still with us albeit the Taft-Hartley Act, another way has
been discovered to attack the unions' funds. The device will now be to bring
action after action, for punitive damages, in state courts.
That the idea of a national labor policy and law, or the threat to it by
these decisions, is more than an abstract one seems clear. Under the Russell
ruling the power of a union to carry on collective action is seriously impaired.
How it is impaired varies from state to state. In some states, the economic
loss occasioned by a strike may result in suits for punitive damages; in others,
similar suits will not arise because punitive damages are severely restricted or
prohibited altogether. Presumably the employer who implements a lock-out
will also be subjected to such action where state laws permit. The danger here
is the lack of certainty and clarity in the law.
Each and every union must, now, reassess its practices particularly in
strike situations. While strikes are relatively infrequent (occurring in about
3% of all collective bargaining situations in 1957),69 the right to strike is
fundamental to the non-slave society. Accordingly, the impact of these de-
cisions on that right will require the closest scrutiny.
That the above is no mere nightmare for the unions is readily seen
from the fact above noted, that for the same strike action on which
Russell recovered compensatory and punitive damages, separate suits were
filed by other individuals for an aggregate sum of $1,500,000 against the
UAW.
65 "UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 652 (1958).
66 Goldberg, op. cit. supra note 33, at 124.
67 N.Y. Times, May 28, 1958, p. 30, col. 2.
68 The classic study of equitable judicial activity in labor disputes up to 1930 is FRANKFURTER &
GREENE, TE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
69 Bureau of Labor Statistics figures applied in 3 AFL-CIO Collective Bargaining Report No. 11
(1958).
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One would have hoped that we were progressing toward a day when the
litigious atmosphere of organizing and bargaining would gradually be re-
placed by a more constructive approach; the day when the "two-sided"
rectangular bargaining table might be replaced by a figurative if not physical
"round table." Far from speeding the arrival of that happy day, the subject
decisions have slowed whatever progress was being made and have invited
a course of action that can well prolong and deepen industrial strife in given
situations. Little contribution to good labor-management relations is spawned
by the burdens, delays and uncertainties of continuing civil litigation.
VI. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
While attachment of blame for the confusion which now exists in the
federal-state jurisdictional equation is irrelevant, determination of the cause
for such confusion is vital. In its recent decisions the Court has pointed out
the serious problem still existing. Considering the number of exceptions re-
cently made to the pre-emption doctrine, and the narrowing of its previously
broad scope, one day the Court must exhaust its refinements. More immedi-
ately there is the grave threat to the continued existence of a labor policy
national in character. It is by no means clear that the problem will be solved
by expanding the NLRB's self-imposed jurisdictional standards quantitatively
to cover all interstate business and thus to eliminate the no-man's land in those
areas where remedies are exclusively federal."° This expansion is no doubt
needed to carry out the general purposes of the act, but it offers no solution
to the basic qualitative problem of defining what remedies are within the
shrinking concept of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
It may be that the Youngdahl case and its predecessors need careful
study by the Congress in terms of police power vis-a-vis proper union activity.
If the law is to be as was held in that case, let it be established by legislation
based upon careful investigation. The vital thing is to obtain some degree of
certainty and clarity. More important than the issue of protected union activity
is the basic issue of whether the federal act, and Board and the courts will
implement our labor policy or whether forty-nine independent judiciaries will
attempt to do so.
The Congress has a clear duty to decide these issues, and there are signs
that the judiciary wishes that this would happen. It is for the national legisla-
ture to declare whether the United States is to have a national labor policy
or the fragmentized gallimufry of provincial enactments and adjudications
appropriate to a peaceful, pastoral society of the 18th Century. Lack of a
national labor policy might help to bring us the pastoral society; that it would
bring any tolerable "peace" is at best dubious.
70 The 1954 jurisdictional standards of the NLRB were recently revised to fill the pre-emption
vacuum. The 1954 standards for non-retail businesses were changed from $50,000 direct outflow,
$500,000 direct inflow, or an indirect outflow and inflow amounting to $1,000,000, to 'the reduced
amount of $50,000 outflow or inflow, direct or indirect. Jurisdiction will now be asserted in retail
businesses with a gross yearly volume of $500,000, as compared with a direct inflow of $1,000,000;
indirect inflow of $2,000,000; or direct outflow of $100,000 required under the 1954 yardstick. For
other changes see N.L.R.B. R-576, 1 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1610 (Oct. 2, 1958).
